By Marc Amat
Political scientist, professor of political science, and member of the IEN Board of Trustees
On November 3, Americans will head to the polls once again. The midterm elections will renew the entire House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate, determining the balance of power in Congress during the final two years of Donald Trump’s term. Republicans currently hold majorities in both chambers, but only by narrow margins: Democrats need to gain three seats in the House of Representatives to regain control and four seats in the Senate. The elections also come at a challenging moment for the president: a Reuters/Ipsos poll published in September put his approval rating at 32%, the lowest level recorded in that survey series.
Victòria Alsina has followed American politics closely for many years. A political scientist and holder of a PhD in Political and Social Sciences from Pompeu Fabra University, she spent a decade in the United States, first affiliated with the Harvard Kennedy School and later serving as professor and academic director of the Center for Urban Science + Progress at New York University. Between 2018 and 2019, she served as Delegate of the Government of Catalonia to the United States and Canada, and between 2021 and 2022 she was Minister for Foreign Action and Open Government of the Generalitat de Catalunya. She is currently Director of Strategy and Planning at IL3-University of Barcelona, Professor of Political Science at UPF, and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of North American Studies (IEN).
In this interview, we discuss what is truly at stake in these midterms, what explains the strength of Trumpism, and why Europeans often struggle to understand how Americans vote.
Why are these midterms particularly important? What is really at stake?
There is a question that I find especially interesting: are we witnessing the usual correction that the party of an unpopular president tends to suffer in midterm elections, or are there factors that could make that correction more significant? Historically, midterms tend to hurt the party occupying the White House, but this time there are several elements that make them especially worth watching.
One of those factors is that Trump is not on the ballot, yet he has made considerable efforts to nationalize these elections. Some Republican candidates might prefer their races to be viewed through a local lens, but Trump has chosen to place himself at the center of the campaign. And this is happening at a time when his approval ratings are low.
What other factors could prove decisive?
There are two others that I believe are particularly important.
The first is affordability, the cost of living. The economy has once again become a central concern for Americans. During the presidential election, issues such as immigration, security, and the broader Make America Great Again narrative played a major role. Now, however, the cost of living has returned to the forefront, and that is significant because it tends to hurt the governing party.
The second factor is voter mobilization. Some of the groups Trump was particularly successful at mobilizing in the presidential election, including young men, Hispanic voters, and people without a college degree, traditionally participate less in midterm elections. On the other hand, many Democratic voters are highly motivated by their opposition to Trump. The key question is the extent to which each party will succeed in getting its voters to the polls.
From a European perspective, we often struggle to understand what is happening in the United States. What are we missing?
I think Europeans greatly oversimplify who Republican voters are. We tend to caricature them and assume that anyone who votes for Trump fits a very specific, almost extreme profile. That is simply not the case.
There are many perfectly rational people in the United States who vote Republican for reasons that Europeans often fail to fully grasp.
Under Trump, the Republican Party successfully connected with concerns that already existed among many Americans: a sense of uncontrolled borders, inflation, and economic uncertainty. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party was advancing an agenda that was much closer to European sensibilities and therefore felt more familiar to us. I think this is one of our biggest biases: because the Democratic agenda resembles the European one, we tend to identify more strongly with it, while oversimplifying Republican voters.
Does that help explain why Trump maintains such a solid base of support?
Absolutely.
Trump was able to connect with the concerns of a significant segment of the American middle and working classes, particularly regarding economic worries and the feeling that things were out of control. At the same time, however, he built a campaign around a sense of aspiration and hope.
Make America Great Again was not just a slogan. It projected a particular vision of what it meant to be American again. It connected both anxiety and optimism, and from Europe we did not fully understand that dynamic.
I also believe there is another important point: this strategy will outlast Trump himself. The Republican Party knows it needs to broaden its electoral coalition and connect with voters who have not traditionally formed part of its core base, including Hispanics, young people, and some African American voters. That is why I think the political framework Trump has created is unlikely to disappear once he is no longer the central figure.
Do Americans also feel that Europeans do not fully understand them?
The truth is that they do not care very much.
International affairs occupy a much smaller place in public debate in the United States than American politics does in Europe. Europeans constantly watch Washington, follow what the U.S. president says about Europe, and closely monitor developments in Ukraine. But that does not mean the average American follows those issues with the same intensity.
I remember comparing newspaper front pages at times when European media were almost entirely focused on an international issue involving Trump and Trump i Zelenski. On that very same day, the major story in the United States was the rising price of eggs.
That illustrates the difference in perspective quite well: for many American voters, the cost of groceries has a far more immediate impact than events unfolding in Europe.
To understand what will happen on November 3, do we also need to stop viewing the midterms as a single national election?
Absolutely.
This is another mistake Europeans often make. These are not national elections in the way we typically understand them. In the House of Representatives there are 435 separate elections, one in each district, and in the Senate every state has its own political dynamics.
That is why forecasts based solely on national polling data have significant limitations.
The system is highly structured, and there are relatively few truly competitive districts. The decisive battles are concentrated in specific geographic areas. This forces analysts to look state by state and district by district. You can have a very clear national trend and still see a much less dramatic outcome in terms of seats.
And what about the Senate?
The Senate is even more challenging for Democrats.
They need to defend the seats they already hold in highly competitive states while simultaneously gaining new seats in territories that have traditionally leaned Republican.
This year there are particularly interesting cases because several states have entered the electoral spotlight that, a few years ago, few people would have considered worth following closely. Texas is probably the clearest example.
Traditionally a Republican state, Texas has become the focus of unusual attention and investment in its Senate race during these midterms. Once again, this demonstrates that the American electoral map is far more complex than many Europeans tend to perceive.
Regardless of the outcome, could these midterms alter the relationship between the United States and Europe?
I do not believe they will fundamentally change the broader framework.
Trump’s international outlook is rooted in a very clear America First philosophy and a desire to redefine the relationship with Europe, whether in defense, trade, or technology.
One of Trump’s defining characteristics has been the way he has blurred the lines between trade policy, foreign policy, and national security. He uses tariffs, for example, as a geopolitical bargaining tool.
Therefore, while the results of the midterms may affect domestic politics and Trump’s relationship with Congress, I do not think they will significantly alter this broader conception of foreign policy.
