By Bego Grau
In an era where knowledge travels faster than borders can contain it, scientific research has become more than an academic pursuit: it is a strategic asset. Laboratories, universities, and research centers now sit at the intersection of innovation, economic power, and national security. The term “research security” has emerged to describe this evolving reality — but its meaning, implications, and limits are often misunderstood.
Zach Carwile is Associate Director of the Research and Innovation Security and Competitiveness (RISC) Institute at The Texas A&M University System, where he works at the intersection of academia, industry, and government to strengthen research security practices. He previously served as Deputy Chief Research Security Officer for the A&M System, focusing on protecting the integrity of sensitive U.S. government-sponsored research.
Before transitioning to higher education leadership, he spent 30 years in service to U.S. national security, including roles in the U.S. Army and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where he worked on protecting intellectual property, research, and critical infrastructure.
Carwile is one of the invited experts at the US & EU Barcelona Meeting, organized by the IEN, where leading voices from both sides of the Atlantic gather to reflect on security, governance, and transatlantic cooperation in a rapidly evolving global landscape.
For an audience encountering the term for the first time, how would you define research security?
“Research security” is about safeguarding the research enterprise from misappropriation, misuse, and interference. In the United States, it has been defined as protecting research and development from threats that could harm national or economic security, compromise research integrity, or involve foreign government interference.
In the European context, similar ideas appear under terms like “knowledge security”, “trusted research”, or “responsible internationalization”. All these concepts point to the same goal: protecting the integrity of research while allowing it to thrive.
Research security only works when governments and academic institutions collaborate, neither can do it alone.
Why has research security become such a central concern for U.S. research institutions in recent years?
The research enterprise is built on openness, transparency, reciprocity, and merit-based competition. These principles are strengths, but they can also create vulnerabilities. Many countries now see research security as essential to their national interests. Some global competitors are actively targeting and exploiting their research environments to acquire cutting-edge knowledge at lower cost and shorter timelines.
Why is research security more than just a regulatory compliance issue for universities?
Unauthorized sharing of research can jeopardize a researcher’s reputation and future funding opportunities. Addressing these risks is, therefore, not only a compliance matter but a core institutional responsibility. Institutions that implement strong research security measures are better positioned to compete for funding and collaborate internationally.
Why has research become such a strategic issue in global competition?
Scientific research fuels both economic and military advancement. Some strategic competitors seek to acquire foreign research to accelerate their military capabilities. In certain countries, policies such as military–civil fusion require universities and private industry to directly support national defense objectives.
Research that is intended for civilian or humanitarian purposes can be diverted to surveillance or military applications without the original researcher’s knowledge. Beyond military implications, misappropriation of cutting-edge technologies, such as advanced pharmaceuticals or semiconductor design, threatens economic security. And economic security is inseparable from national security.
How has scientific research and innovation become a core arena of geopolitical competition?
A strong research enterprise is vital for societal resilience. For example, investment in biomedical research improves public health and quality of life. Research in infrastructure strengthens economic stability. These improvements make countries more competitive globally.
Healthier societies with dynamic innovation ecosystems attract investment and highly skilled talent. Scientific leadership therefore translates into economic opportunity and geopolitical influence. Knowledge has become a form of power.
Public debates often associate research security with espionage. How has the threat landscape evolved beyond traditional spying?
Espionage remains a reality. Some nations use intelligence-linked actors to conduct clandestine efforts to obtain foreign research, often to support military development. However, threats are not limited to state actors, individuals may attempt to misappropriate research for personal gain — driven by ambition, financial incentives, or ego.
There is also the risk of trusted insiders. A researcher may compromise security intentionally, or simply by failing to follow established protocols. Even without malicious intent, poor security mechanism can jeopardize years of work. Research security therefore requires attention not only to external threats, but also to internal vulnerabilities.
Open collaboration has long driven scientific progress. Why is this openness now being reassessed?
I would argue that openness itself is not being challenged. Openness and reciprocity are fundamental to academic life. Collaboration across disciplines and borders drives discovery and innovation.
What is changing is not the commitment to openness, but the evaluation of risk within collaborations. As recipients of public funding, institutions must understand who they are partnering with and implement reasonable measures to protect research from misuse. The goal is not to restrict collaboration, but to manage it responsibly.
How can governments and institutions address risk without overgeneralization or discrimination?
The starting point should always be the “what,” not the “who.” We must first determine which categories of information or material require protection.
From there, decisions about sharing should be based on technology type, documented risks, and national regulations, such as export control frameworks. Restrictions must be grounded in the potential applications of the technology, not in ethnicity or nationality. Risk assessment should be precise, proportional, and evidence-based.
In fields like AI, biotechnology, or quantum computing, civilian research can have military implications. How should societies approach dual-use innovation without slowing progress?
Funding source and data classification are key factors. Research funded by defense agencies or involving proprietary data may require additional controls. Certain technology areas, such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing present clear dual-use risks. Institutions should work closely with research teams to understand both intended and unintended applications of their work.
Protecting dual-use technologies begins with understanding the research portfolio and developing clear, technology-based criteria for safeguards.
What should Europe take away from the U.S. experience?
Research institutions depend heavily on guidance from governments, regarding which technologies merit greater scrutiny. In the United States, there is increasing coordination between federal agencies and academia. Government entities publish lists of critical and emerging technologies, helping institutions prioritize safeguards.
Programs such as the National Science Foundation’s Trust Framework focus first on the most sensitive areas, such as quantum technologies. Europe is beginning to move in a similar direction through recent Council recommendations on research security.
If research security becomes a defining issue of the next decade, what misunderstandings must be overcome?
The most urgent misconception is that strengthening research security requires sacrificing openness. It does not. Openness is essential for innovation. But we must also recognize that adversaries may exploit that openness. The challenge is to manage risk in international collaborations, especially conflicts of interest and commitment, before projects begin.
Progress depends on deeper engagement between governments and research institutions. Together, they must develop governance frameworks that are practical, sustainable, and protective, without undermining the collaborative spirit that makes research possible. Research security is not about closing doors. It is about ensuring that when we open them, we do so responsibly.
Zach Carwile, will be speaking at the US & EU Barcelona Meeting. 2026. Securing Tomorrow’s Alliance: Re-imagining Transatlantic Security in a Changing World.
Thursday, March 26th
